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Abstract Simple locative sentences show a variety of pseudo-quantificational inter-
pretations. Some locatives give the impression of universal quantification over parts of
objects, others involve existential quantification, and yet others cannot be character-
ized by either of these quantificational terms. This behavior is explained by virtually
all semantic theories of locatives. What has not been previously observed is that
similar quantificational variability is also exhibited by locative sentences containing
indefinites with the ‘a’ article. This phenomenon is especially problematic for tradi-
tional existential treatments of indefinites. We propose a solution where indefinites
denote properties and are assigned locations similarly to other spatial descriptions.
This Property-Eigenspace Hypothesis accounts for the correlation between the inter-
pretations of locative indefinites and the pseudo-quantificational effects with simple
entity-denoting NPs. Thereby, the proposal opens up a new empirical domain for
property-based theories of indefinites, with implications for the analysis of collective
descriptions, generics, negative polarity items and part–whole structure.
Keywords Indefinite ⋅ NP ⋅ Locative ⋅ PP ⋅ Property ⋅ Eigenspace
1 Introduction
Existential quantification is traditionally seen as a core element in the meaning of
indefinite descriptions. However, applying a simple existential analysis to naturally
occurring indefinites has often proven problematic. Indefinites in sentences involving
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generic, predicative, wide-scope and anaphoric effects have all been identified as seri-
ous challenges for the traditional existential account. Much work in natural language
semantics since the 1970s has been driven by these challenges. This paper addresses yet
another puzzle for existential theories of indefinites, which has nonetheless received
little attention: the interpretation of indefinites appearing within locative prepositional
phrases. The problem was first introduced by Iatridou (2003, 2007), who attributed
the observation to Irene Heim (p.c.). The contrast in (1) demonstrates the puzzle.
(1) a. Michael is far from a gas station.
b. Michael is close to a gas station.
In the appropriate context—e.g. a car race in the desert, whenMichael’s car is running
out of gas—sentence (1a) exhibits a universal interpretation: Michael is claimed to
be far from all gas stations. By contrast, sentence (1b) has a standard existential
interpretation, which only requires there to be one gas station near Michael.
At first blush we may suspect that the contrast in (1) can be explained by pos-
tulating some covert negation element within the meaning of far from. This would
allow us to derive the universal interpretation of sentence (1a) by assigning the
existential denotation of the indefinite narrow scope below the postulated negation.
However, the universal interpretation of (1a) only marks one extreme within a variety
of non-existential effects with locative indefinites. This is illustrated by the following
examples.
(2) a. Michael is more than/less than 5km from a gas station.
b. Michael is exactly 5km from a gas station.
While the examples in (2a) show a similar contrast to the one between (1a) and
(1b), the interpretation of sentence (2b) is more complex. A prominent interpretation
of this sentence requires that Michael be exactly 5km from the gas station that is
nearest to him. This interpretation is not expected by the traditional existential analysis.
Furthermore, it cannot be simply described by combining an existential quantifier with
covert negation. Similar problems reappear in other cases of indefinites with various
locative PPs. We conclude that stipulating negation as part of the meaning of certain
locatives would not be a sufficiently general solution to the problem of non-existential
locative indefinites.
To solve this problem, we base our analysis on the notion of kinds or proper-
ties, which is commonly used in theories of indefinites (Milsark 1974; Carlson 1977;
Chierchia 1998). Following these works, and adopting the theoretical setting of Partee
(1987), we assume that a indefinites are derivationally ambiguous between properties
and existential quantifiers. We propose that property concepts have a spatial dimen-
sion similar to entity concepts. This allows us to treat locative indefinites as in (1) and
(2) by extending standard analyses of simple locative sentences like Michael is far
from/close to London, whichmake a statement about the distance between two entities.
When a region is occupied by a complex entity like London, pseudo-quantificational
effects often arise as a direct result of its part–whole structure. Thus, being far from
London requires being far from all of its subparts. By contrast, being close to London
only requires being close to one of its subparts. Our analysis of the contrast in (1)
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follows from a similar consideration about the location of properties. Sentences (1a–
b) are treated as making a statement about Michael’s distance from the property gas
station. The location of a property is assumed to be the union of the regions associated
with entities in its extension. With this assumption, sentences (1a–b) are analyzed as
requiring that Michael be far from/close to the union of all gas station regions. In (1a)
this analysis entails that Michael is far from all gas stations. By contrast, in (1b) it
only requires that Michael be close to one gas station. Thus, we explain the contrast
in (1a–b) on the basis of a simple geometrical distinction between the locatives far
from and close to, which is observed independently of indefinites. The interpretation of
sentences as in (2), as well as other non-existential effects with locative indefinites, are
similarly explained by geometrical considerations about the meaning of spatial con-
cepts. The pseudo-quantificational effects with locative indefinites constitute a new
type of evidence for property-based treatments of indefinites that have been proposed
in the last two decades (Zimmermann 1993; Van Geenhoven 1996; McNally 1998,
2011, 2014; Chung and Ladusaw 2003; Van Geenhoven and McNally 2005; among
others). Furthermore, as we will show, the property-based analysis of locative indefi-
nites also has broader implications for the analysis of collective descriptions, negative
polarity items and part–whole structure.
Section 2 introduces standard assumptions on indefinites and locatives, together
with our main hypothesis about how properties are assigned a location, or eigenspace.
In Sect. 3 we show that this analysis deals successfully with a variety of locative
sentences with indefinites. Section 4 gives further support for this analysis by showing
its advantages over putative accounts using covert negation. Section 5 discusses some
broader implications of the proposed account as well as some open problems.
2 The basic proposal
The key elements of our proposal are the property denotation of a indefinites and a
general semantics of locatives.We start out by reviewing two approaches to indefinites
in the literature: the quantificational approach and the predicative, or property-based
approach. Following Partee (1987) and others, we assume that a indefinites in English
are initially property-denoting, but they may end up denoting existential quantifiers
due to a derivational mechanism. We show how this approach leads to systematic
ambiguity with locative indefinites. To analyze this ambiguity, we review some basic
notions from previous work on locative expressions. Then we introduce our main
contribution to the analysis of this puzzle: the assumption that properties can be located
like ordinary entities, and the principle governing this procedure, which we call the
Property-Eigenspace Hypothesis.
2.1 Indefinites and properties
Since Montague (1973), many works on natural language semantics have analyzed
all NPs as denoting generalized quantifiers. Notably, Barwise and Cooper (1981)
treat items like a and some as denoting existential determiners. This classic approach
analyzes all occurrences of indefinites as existential or ‘intersective’ generalized quan-
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tifiers (Keenan andWesterståhl 2011). An alternative view in semantic theory has been
to analyze at least some indefinites as denoting properties (Milsark 1974).1 Under
this analysis the indefinite article a has a null contribution to the NP’s denotation.
Accordingly, the basic denotation of an indefinite like a gas station is assumed to be
the same property denoted by the nominal part gas station. This approach directly
derives a proper interpretation for sentences with predicative indefinites, e.g. this is
a gas station. By contrast, with indefinites in argument positions (e.g. I see a gas
station), the existential or ‘specific’ interpretation has to be derived by an additional
semantic process. In such argument positions, Partee (1987) assumes an existential
operator which applies to properties as part of the interpretation of the indefinite. Thus,
in Partee’s account indefinites are derivationally ambiguous between properties and
existential quantifiers.
These standard procedures are also applicable to indefinites that appear within
prepositional phrases. Standardly, PPs like in NYC and above NYC are analyzed as
determining positionswith respect to the ‘landmark’ object, in this caseNewYorkCity.
Such PPs that specify relations with respect to a landmark are referred to as locative
PPs, or simply locatives. Locative PPs are distinguished from directional PPs like
through NYC and from NYC that determine paths or motions relative to the landmark.
When a locative like in a city contains an indefinite NP, we refer to that indefinite as
a locative indefinite. Following Partee’s flexible account, we embrace two derivations
for sentences with locative indefinites. For instance, sentence (3) below (=(1a)) is
analyzed as derivationally ambiguous between the two representations sketched in
(3a–b).
(3) Michael is far from a gas station.
a. Michael is [[far from] [E [a gas station]]]
b. Michael is [[far from] [a gas station]]
Under the analysis in (3a), a covert existential process applies within the indefinite NP
before it composes with the preposition. In analysis (3b), the preposition’s denotation
directly combines with the property denotation of the indefinite. We use the notation
GS for the property denoted by the indefinite a gas station, and gs for the set associated
with the extension of this property. Accordingly, (3a) leads to the standard analysis in
(4a) below. By contrast, in (3b) the property GS remains intact and serves as the direct
argument of the locative, as formalized in (4b).
(4) a. ∃x ∈ gs. far_from(m, x)
b. far_from(m,GS)
The choice between these two readings is affected by pragmatic factors, most of them
beyond the scope of this paper. What is crucial for our purposes is that both strate-
gies are attested with a indefinites in one context or another. For instance, as we
1 For more recent works following Milsark’s approach see Zimmermann (1993), Van Geenhoven (1996,
1998), McNally (1998, 2009, 2011, 2014), Dayal (1999), Condoravdi et al. (2001), Chung and Ladusaw
(2003), Van Geenhoven and McNally (2005), among others. Other theories often use properties, or kinds,
for treating generic indefinites (Carlson 1977; Carlson and Pelletier 1995; Chierchia 1998). Throughout
this paper we use the term properties since the difference between them and kinds is not crucial for our
purposes.
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will see, for sentence (3), the property-based analysis (4b) gives a correct interpreta-
tion, whereas the standard existential analysis (4a) does not. This existential analysis
becomesmore useful when we consider indefinites with more descriptive content such
as a gas station I know. When used in locatives, such indefinites predominantly show
an existential/specific interpretation. Similar interpretations are also salient with the
indefinites in (5) below.
(5) Michael is far from some/a certain gas station.
In contrast with a indefinites, the indefinites in (5) are unambiguously existential or
specific. We capture this interpretation by assuming that such indefinites only have
the existential analysis in (4a).2 We should note that although for simplicity we adopt
Partee’s existential analysis, this does not do justice to specificity and other notorious
phenomena in the semantics and pragmatics of indefinites.3 To highlight this shortcom-
ing, we informally describe existential/specific interpretations of locative indefinites
as in (6) below.
(6) Michael is far from SOME∃ gas station.
This notation can be read as having the same import as (4a), but it is also used in order
to convey our conviction that the a indefinite in (3) is equivalent in one of its read-
ings to the some indefinite in (5), while avoiding details about this existential/specific
analysis. Further, NPs that are unambiguously quantificational can also appear in loca-
tive sentences, e.g. Michael is far from every gas station. Such locative sentences do
not require any predication over properties. Rather, they are analyzed as quantifica-
tion over entities and treated by standard assumptions about quantifier scope (Barker
2015).
2.2 Locatives and eigenspaces
As we saw, sentence (3) has a prominent interpretation that is not derived by simple
assumptions on existential quantification or specificity. We informally paraphrase this
interpretation by writing ‘Michael is far from EVERY∀ gas station’. However, since we do
not assume that this interpretation involves a universal quantifier over entities, we refer
to it as pseudo-universal. Analysis (4b) models the pseudo-universal interpretation by
letting the locative relation apply to the entity denotation of the nameMichael and the
property denotation of the indefinite a gas station. Our challenge is to explain how
properties stand in such locative relations to entities, examine the interpretations that
this option derives and check whether they conform with linguistic intuitions.
We start out by reviewing some standard assumptions on the semantics of locative
PPs (Wunderlich 1991; Zwarts and Winter 2000). Let us first consider the simple
locative sentence (7) below.
2 McNally’s (1998) property-based account of there sentences might require that the indefinites in (5) also
denote properties, and not only existential quantifiers. See more on this point in Sect. 5.
3 See Fodor and Sag (1982), Reinhart (1997), Winter (2001), Von Heusinger (2011) on wide-
scope/specificity; Kamp (1981), Heim (1982), Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991), Kamp and Reyle (1993)
on discourse binding.
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(7) Michael is far from London.
At the compositional level, sentence (7) expresses a binary relation between entities.
This is formalized below.
(8) far_from(m, l)
In this analysis, the entity l is the landmark and the entity m is the located object.
More explicitly, the analysis in (8) is expanded to the following spatial analysis.
(9) FAR_FROM(LOC(m), LOC(l))
In (9), the relation FAR_FROM is the two-place locative predicate underlying themeaning
of the binary relation far_from. The relation FAR_FROM holds in (9) between two spatial
objects: the locations LOC(m) and LOC(l) of the entitiesm and l. FollowingWunderlich
(1991), we refer to the location of an entity as the entity’s eigenspace.4 As we formally
elaborate below, we use points and regions (=sets of points) as the spatial semantic
objects that model eigenspaces. In locative sentences, we assume that the eigenspace
of the located object is a point, whereas the landmark has a region as its eigenspace
(see fn. 5 below). When the eigenspace of the entity for Michael is the point m, and
the eigenspace of London is the region L , we write:
(10) LOC(m) = m; LOC(l) = L
Summing up, we treat the logical form (8) as expressing a spatial relation FAR_FROM
between the point m and the region L . In formula:
(11) FAR_FROM(m, L)
This analysis immediately expects a pseudo-universal interpretation of sentence
(7). By basic properties of the locative relation FAR_FROM, which we spell out formally
in the next section, it follows that when a point m is far from a region L , it is far
from every point in L . Thus, analysis (11) expects that sentence (7) is interpreted
similarly to the statement ‘Michael is far from EVERY∀ part of London’. This observation
on entity-denoting noun phrases is unsurprising (Iris et al. 1988; Casati and Varzi
1999; Johansson 2004). However, when it is combined with the property analysis of
indefinites, it provides a straightforward account of their puzzling behavior in locative
sentences.
2.3 Locative indefinites: the Property-Eigenspace Hypothesis
Our account of the pseudo-universal interpretation of (3) follows from the analysis
in (4b), where the spatial relation holds between an entity and a property. To deal
with this situation, we let any spatial property have an eigenspace of its own, similar
to spatial entities. Thus, when locating the entity m and the property GS we get the
following spatial-level analysis of (4b).
4 German eigen = ‘its own’. Our intuitive use of the term eigenspace should not be confused with the
mathematical notion of eigenspace in Linear Algebra.
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(12) FAR_FROM(LOC(m), LOC(GS))
Here the spatial relation FAR_FROM holds between Michael’s eigenspace and the
eigenspace for the property GS. The main new element of our proposal is in the way
properties are located. We define the eigenspace of properties on the basis of the
eigenspaces of entities in their extension. Specifically, we adopt the following hypoth-
esis.
(13) Property-Eigenspace Hypothesis (PEH): A property’s eigenspace is the
union of eigenspaces for entities in its extension.
In our analysis (12) of sentence (3), the PEH requires that the eigenspace LOC(GS) of
the property GS be the union of eigenspaces for entities in the set gs, the extension of
the property. In formula:
(14) LOC(GS) =
⋃
{LOC(x) ∶ x ∈ gs}
Summing up, we get the following property-based analysis of sentence (3):
(15) FAR_FROM(m,
⋃
{LOC(x) ∶ x ∈ gs})
In words, (15) states that the point m for Michael’s location is far from the region
composed of all gas station regions. As we show in detail in Sect. 3, this statement
correctly captures the pseudo-universal interpretation of the locative indefinite in (3).
More generally, our analysis derives non-existential interpretations of locative indefi-
nites by using the same principles that account for locative sentences with referential
NPs. Because of this reduction, the PEH expects the following generalization.
(16) PEHGeneralization: The pseudo-quantificational behavior of locative indef-
inites correlates with the pseudo-quantificational behavior of locative referen-
tial NPs.
This generalization makes a connection between the interpretation of locative
indefinites, and the geometrical aspects of locative meanings as attested with pseudo-
quantificational interpretations of locative referential NPs. It should be kept in mind
that we assume that, in addition to their property-based analysis, all locative indefinites
also have standard existential/specific readings. The correlation expected in (16) only
concerns pseudo-quantificational interpretations of locative sentenceswith indefinites,
and not their standard existential reading. For instance, as we have seen, the pseudo-
universal interpretation of the indefinite a gas station in sentence (3) correlates with
a pseudo-universal interpretation of the proper name London in (7). According to the
PEH generalization, this type of correlation should hold for all pseudo-quantificational
interpretations of locative indefinites. Specifically, for any non-existential interpreta-
tion of locative indefinites, the PEH generalization expects to find a parallel effect
with locative referential NPs, and vice versa. Section 3 shows empirical support for
this expectation.
3 Evidence for the Property-Eigenspace Hypothesis
This section lays out themain arguments for our property-based approach and the PEH.
We go over different types of locative relations, the non-existential effects they lead
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to with indefinites, and the way these effects are accounted for in our proposal. This
account supports the PEH generalization, hence the PEH itself, and more generally,
the property-based account of a indefinites.
3.1 A technical preliminary: topological spaces
In Sect. 2 and throughout this paper, we treat eigenspaces of landmarks (e.g. London in
(7)) as regions. Eigenspaces of located objects (e.g.Michael in (7)) are unrealistically
modeled as points. Accordingly, locative relations are treated as relations between
points and regions.5 Wemodel points as elements of a topological space, where regions
are sets of such points. Standardly, a topological space is a structure ⟨M, T ⟩ where M
is a non-empty set and T is a collection of subsets of M . The collection T includes
the empty set and M itself. Furthermore, T is closed under arbitrary unions and finite
intersections.6 Topological spaces are formally defined below, with the accompanying
standard notions of open and closed sets.
Definition 1 (topological space, open/closed sets) Let M be a non-empty set and let
T ⊆ ℘(M) be a collection of subsets of M , where∅ ∈ T , M ∈ T , and for everyA ⊆ T :
⋃
A ∈ T , and furthermore,
⋂
A ∈ T ifA has finitely many elements. The pair ⟨M, T ⟩
is a topological space, the sets in T are called open and their complements in M are
called closed.
Henceforth we avoid referring to the set T of open sets, and sloppily refer to the set
M itself as a ‘topological space’. The elements of M are what we intuitively refer to
as ‘points’, whereas ‘regions’ are subsets of M .
3.2 Topological locatives
Topological locative concepts are those geometrical concepts that can be defined by
only referring to a topological space (i.e. points and regions), without invoking further
geometrical concepts like distances or directions. The basic topological concepts we
treat are INSIDE and OUTSIDE. Some English locatives that express these concepts are
given below.
(17) Topological locatives
INSIDE: in, inside (of), within
OUTSIDE: out of, outside (of), without
Concentrating on the topological usage of the prepositions in (17), let us consider the
antonyms inside and outside in the following simple sentences.
5 A more general treatment would model locatives as binary relations between regions. However, that
would introduce complications that are unnecessary for our purposes here. See Zwarts and Winter (2000)
for an analysis where all eigenspaces are uniformly treated as regions.
6 I.e. for any subsetA of T , the union ∪A is in T , and ifA has finitely many members then the intersection
∩A is also in T (see Definition 1).
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(18) a. The visitor is inside the building.
b. The visitor is outside the building.
Sentence (18a) has the pseudo-existential interpretation paraphrased in (19a) below,
whereas (18b) has the pseudo-universal interpretation paraphrased in (19b).
(19) a. The visitor is inside SOME∃ part of the building.
b. The visitor is outside EVERY∀ part of the building.
In correspondence with this pseudo-quantificational alternation in (18) we also
observe an existential/universal contrast with indefinites appearing with INSIDE and
OUTSIDE locatives. To illustrate that, let us consider the following sentences collected
from the internet.
(20) a. Every vehicle or trailer which is parked outside of a garage shall display
license plates with current registration tabs.
b. I personally find the planets that formed outside of a star system more
fascinating than ejecta.
c. One-third of the funded proposals shall serve schoolswithin aMetropolitan
County, and at least one-third shall serve schools outside of a Metropolitan
County.
In (20a), the vehicles and trailers quantified over are those that are outside of any
garage. Similarly, in (20b), the planets referred to are those that are formed outside
of any star system. Thus, the indefinites within the outside of locatives of (20a) and
(20b) are interpreted universally. In sentence (20c), the interpretation of the indefinite
with the preposition outside of is again universal. However, the indefinite with the
preposition within is existential. Thus, the schools that are served include those that
are within some metropolitan county and those that are outside of all the relevant
metropolitan counties.
Although we assume a topological space as the basis for our spatial model, for
the topological concepts INSIDE and OUTSIDE we do not exploit the full power of this
ontology. We define these locative relations by merely appealing to set-membership
between points and regions. Below we define these two concepts.
(21) For all points x and regions A:
INSIDE(x, A) ⇔ x ∈ A
OUTSIDE(x, A) ⇔ x /∈ A
In words: a point x is inside a region A if x is a member of A; x is outside A if x is
not in A. This immediately leads to the following observations.
(22) a. INSIDE(x, A) ⇔∃y ∈ A.INSIDE(x,{y})
b. OUTSIDE(x, A) ⇔∀y ∈ A.OUTSIDE(x,{y})
In words: a point x is inside a region A iff x is inside some singleton sub-region {y}
of A; x is outside A iff x is outside every such singleton.
Having observed these facts, we cannot be surprised by the equivalences between
the locative sentences (18a–b) and the quantificational statements in (19a–b). For
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instance, consider the equivalence (18b)⇔(19b).When sentence (18b) holds, by (22b)
we conclude that anypart of the buildingmust consist of points that are disjoint from the
eigenspace of the visitor, hence the visitor is outside every such part, i.e. (19b) holds.
Conversely, when (19b) holds, observation (22b) means that the visitor’s eigenspace
is different than any point within any part of the building. Therefore, the visitor’s
eigenspace is outside the building, as (18b) states. The equivalence (18a)⇔(19a) is
similarly accounted for by observation (22a). In more general terms, this analysis
explains why OUTSIDE locatives support pseudo-universal interpretations with respect
to the part–whole structure of the landmark, while INSIDE locatives support pseudo-
existential interpretations.
Now let us go back to locative indefinites. In (20) we demonstrated that indefinites
in topological PPs may show a similar pattern to locative referential NPs: pseudo-
existential interpretations with INSIDE locatives and pseudo-universal interpretations
with OUTSIDE locatives. The PEH derives such pseudo-quantificational effects with
indefinites as stemming from the same considerations that we used to account for
sentences (18a–b). Let us exemplify that using the following simplified versions of
the sentences in (20c).
(23) a. The school is within a metropolitan county.
b. The school is outside of a metropolitan county.
First, because we use Partee’s assumption on the flexibility of a indefinites, both
sentences in (23) are expected to have an existential reading. However, in addition
to this standard analysis, we also expect a property-based interpretation, derived by
the PEH. To see what this interpretation amounts to, let us use MC for the property
denotationofmetropolitan county,wheremc is the set of entities in its extension.Recall
that the PEH takes the eigenspace of the property MC to be the union of eigenspaces
of entities in mc. This means that the eigenspace LOC(MC) is treated as the union ∪A,
where A is the collection of eigenspaces {LOC(x) ∶ x ∈ mc}. As a direct result from
our observation in (22), we conclude that for every collection of regions A, for every
point x :
(24) a. INSIDE(x,∪A) ⇔ ∃A ∈ A.INSIDE(x, A)
b. OUTSIDE(x,∪A) ⇔ ∀A ∈ A.OUTSIDE(x, A)
In words: a point x is inside the union of the regions in A iff x is inside some region
A in A; x is outside this union iff x is outside every region in A.
This observation explains the behavior of the locative indefinites in (23) as following
from the PEH. In (25a–b) we see this more concretely by considering our PEH-based
analyses of sentences (23a–b), where the point s is the school’s location.
(25) a. INSIDE(s, LOC(MC)) ▹ analysis of (23a)
⇔ INSIDE(s,
⋃
{LOC(x) ∶ x ∈mc}) ▹ by PEH
⇔∃x ∈mc.INSIDE(s, LOC(x)) ▹ by (24a)
b. OUTSIDE(s, LOC(MC)) ▹ analysis of (23b)
⇔ OUTSIDE(s,
⋃
{LOC(x) ∶ x ∈mc}) ▹ by PEH
⇔∀x ∈mc.OUTSIDE(s, LOC(x)) ▹ by (24b)
123
Far from obvious: the semantics of locative indefinites 447
The analysis in (25a) means that the only pseudo-quantificational effect that the PEH
expects for a indefinites with INSIDE locatives is existential. Thus, in this case the
property-based analysis converges with the standard quantificational analysis. By con-
trast, the analysis in (25b) means that the PEH expects OUTSIDE locatives to give rise
to pseudo-universal effects with a indefinites, in addition to their standard existential
reading. This distinction between INSIDE indefinites and OUTSIDE indefinites accounts
for the contrast in (20c) above.
3.3 Distal locatives and ‘outside’ presuppositions
Locatives like far from and close to introduce requirements on the distance between
eigenspaces. English distal locatives often involve a predicate over distances (far,
close, 20km) and a directional preposition (from, to). We distinguish between dis-
tal locatives according to the monotonicity of their distance predicate. Intuitively,
upward/downward monotonicity of the distance predicate is characterized as its clo-
sure under lengthening/shortening of distances within it. For instance, we say that
the adjective far is an upward-monotone distance predicate, because if a distance is
considered far, then any bigger distance is considered far as well. Accordingly, we
classify the locative far from as an upward-monotone distal locative (DISTm↑). Anal-
ogously, the locative close to is classified as downward monotone (DISTm↓). Now let
us consider the distance predicate exactly 20km. A distance of exactly 20km is within
this predicate, but if we lengthen or shorten such a distance, we may get out of the
predicate’s extension. Because of that, we classify the distal expression exactly 20km
from as a non-monotone locative (DISTm¬). Some more examples for the three types
of distal locatives are given below.
(26) Distal locatives
DISTm↑: far from, away from, more than/at least 20km (away) from
DISTm↓: close to, near (to), less than/at most 20km (away) from
DISTm¬: exactly 20km (away) from, between 20km and 30km (away) from
The monotonicity properties of distal locatives affect pseudo-quantificational effects
in simple locative sentences. For the monotone distal locatives at least/most 20km
from, this is illustrated by the intuitive equivalences between sentences (27a–b) below
and the respective sentences in (28a–b).
(27) a. Michael is at least 20km from London.
b. Michael is at most 20km from London.
(28) a. Michael is at least 20km from EVERY∀ part of London.
b. Michael is at most 20km from SOME∃ part of London.
The interpretation of (27a) is pseudo-universal similarly to the behavior of the DISTm↑
locative far from (cf. (7)). Sentence (27b) is only interpreted as pseudo-existential,
similarly to the behavior of the parallel sentence with the DISTm↓ locative close to.
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When monotone distal locatives combine with indefinites, we observe pseudo-
quantificational variability similar to (27). We illustrate that using the intuitive
interpretations of sentences (29a–b) below as paraphrased in (30a–b), respectively.
(29) a. Michael is at least 20km from a gas station.
b. Michael is at most 20km from a gas station.
(30) a. Michael is at least 20km from EVERY∀ gas station.
b. Michael is at most 20km from SOME∃ gas station.
In (29a) the DISTm↑ locative leads to a pseudo-universal interpretation, parallel to
the pseudo-universal interpretation of (27a) above. This is the same parallelism we
observed with the DISTm↑ locative far from in (3) and (7). In (29b) the DISTm↓ locative
supports a (pseudo) existential interpretation parallel to the interpretation of (27b)
above. These parallelisms between (29) and (27) show further support for our PEH
generalization in (16). To see how the PEH accounts for these data, let us look further
into the formal semantics of distal locatives. We endow the spatial ontology with a
metric function d that models distances between points as real numbers. Formally, a
metric function over a set M is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (metric function) Let M be a non-empty set, and let d be a function
from the cartesian product M × M to non-negative real numbers in R. The function
d is called a metric function if it satisfies the following requirements for all elements
x, y ∈ M :
d(x, y) = d(y, x) (symmetry)
d(x, y) + d(y, z) ≥ d(x, z) (triangle inequality)
d(x, y) = 0 iff x = y (identity of indiscernibles)
The set M together with the metric function d are called a metric space. Any metric
space can be naturally defined as a topological space (Kelley 1955, p. 119). We let
a metric space M with its natural topology be the spatial ontology for distal loca-
tives. Definition 3 below naturally extends the metric function d to measure distances
between points and closed regions.7
Definition 3 (distance) For every non-empty closed region A ⊆ M and a point x ∈ M
not in A, the distance between x and A is defined by:
d(x, A) = min({d(x, y) ∶ y ∈ A}).
In words: d(x, A) is the minimal distance between x and points in A. Here and
henceforth, we assume for simplicity that all eigenspace regions are closed. Further,
Definition 3 ignores cases where the point x is in the region A. The reason for this
will be clarified as we go along.
A distal locative concept is defined on the basis of its distance predicate, or the
corresponding set of distances. Suppose that R is a set of non-negative real numbers
that correspond to distances in ametric space. On the basis of the set R, a distal relation
DISTR is defined as follows.
7 On closed regions see Definition 1 above. Using closed regions allows us to analyze a distance from a
region as a minimum rather than an infimum. On the justification for the assumption in Definition 3 that
the point x is not in A, see our discussion below of ‘outside presuppositions’.
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(31) For any region A and point x /∈ A:
DISTR(x, A) ⇔ d(x, A) ∈ R
In words: for any set R of non-negative real numbers, the relation DISTR holds between
a point x and a region A if the distance between x and A is a number in R.
Specific distal locatives are directly derived by the definition in (31) with various
distance predicates determining the set R. For the locative far from, we assume that the
distal predicate far contributes as the set R a semi-open interval (r,∞), of all the real
numbers bigger than some contextually given r . By using this interval, (31) derives
a definition for the locative relation FAR_FROM. Formally, for every region A and point
x /∈ A we have:
(32) FAR_FROM(x, A) ⇔ DIST(r,∞)(x, A) ⇔ d(x, A) > r
In words: a point x is considered far from a region A iff the distance between x and
A is bigger than r . We note that the interval (r,∞) corresponding to the predicate far
is upward-monotone in the following sense: for every real number r ′ in (r,∞), any
number bigger than r ′ is in (r,∞) as well. As we will see below, central semantic
properties of the locative far from follow directly from this upward-monotonicity of
the interval (r,∞).
Other distal concepts are similarly derived from (31), by specifying the real numbers
in the set R of distances in the extension of the distance predicate. Thus, semantic
properties of distal locatives are systematically affected by monotonicity properties of
the distance predicate that they contain. For the DISTm↑ locative at least 20km from we
assume that the set R is the interval [20,∞) of real numbers that model the distances
of 20km and more. Accordingly we denote:
(33) AT_LEAST_20KM_FROM(x, A) ⇔ DIST[20,∞)(x, A) ⇔ d(x, A) ≥ 20
In words: the point x is at least 20km from the region A iff the distance between them
is greater or equal than 20. The interval [20,∞) in (33) is again upward-monotone.
When the set R of real numbers is upward-monotone as in (32) and (33), we get
the following fact, similar to fact (24b) about OUTSIDE locatives.
(34) Let R be an upward-monotone set of distances. For any collection of regions
A and a point x /∈ ∪A, we have:
DISTR(x,∪A) ⇔ ∀A ∈ A.DISTR(x, A)
In words: when R is upward-monotone, the distance between a point x and the union
of regions in A is in R iff the distance between x and every region A in A is in R.
Specifically in our examples for DISTm↑ locatives, we get:
(35) a. FAR_FROM(x,∪A) ⇔∀A ∈ A.FAR_FROM(x, A)
b. AT_LEAST_20KM_FROM(x,∪A) ⇔∀A ∈ A.AT_LEAST_20KM_FROM(x, A)
These equivalences immediately account for the pseudo-universal interpretations of
sentences with DISTm↑ locatives. First, sentence (7) (‘Michael is far from London’) is
analyzed as equivalent to Michael is far from EVERY∀ part of London, and similarly for
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the equivalence (27a)⇔(28a) with the predicate at least 20km. We employ a similar
analysis for the pseudo-quantificational interpretation of a indefinites with DISTm↑
locatives. Let us consider for instance the PEH-based analysis below of sentence
(29a) (=‘Michael is at least 20km from a gas station’), and the equivalence it gives
rise to.8
(36) AT_LEAST_20KM_FROM(m, LOC(GS)) ▹ analysis of (29a)
⇔ AT_LEAST_20KM_FROM(m,
⋃
{LOC(x) ∶ x ∈ gs}) ▹ by PEH
⇔∀x ∈ gs.AT_LEAST_20KM_FROM(m, LOC(x)) ▹ by (35b)
This is the pseudo-universal interpretation of (29a), typical of many DISTm↑ indefinites.
We would now like to consider the formal treatment of DISTm↓ locatives like close
to. However, before moving on there is a basic empirical question about such locatives
that we need to address: can we indeed classify their pseudo-quantificational behavior
as existential? Let us consider example (37a) below, and the attempt to paraphrase it
in (37b).
(37) a. Michael is close to London.
b. Michael is close to some part of London.
There is little doubt that sentence (37a) entails (37b). However, whether there is also
an entailment in the other direction is less evident. Suppose that Michael is in London.
In such a case there are surely one or more parts of London that Michael is close
to, hence sentence (37b) is true and acceptable, even if somewhat uninformative. By
contrast, when we know that Michael is in London it would be very odd to assert
sentence (37a). We attribute this oddity of (37a) not to mere falsity of the assertion,
but to a presupposition failure. In general terms, we assume that any sentence of the
form A is close to B presupposes that A is outside B, but does not assert it. As evidence
for this claim consider the following examples, based on the presupposition tests from
von Fintel (2004).
(38) a. A: Mary lives close to her parents’ home.
B: Hey, wait a minute. I had no idea that she has left their home.
b. I hope that Mary lives close to her parents’ place.
c. IfMary is living close to her parents, she has a chance of having her laundry
done fairly regularly.
Using von Fintel’s tests, we take the examples in (38) as support for our assumption
about the outside presupposition of close to. In (38a), B’s reaction indicates that A’s
utterance presupposes that Mary lives out of her parents’ home, rather than asserting
this claim. Further, in (38b) the utterance does not express a hope thatMary doesn’t live
with her parents, but rather presupposes it as a fact. Lastly, in (38c) the statement that
Mary does not live with her parents gets projected out of the conditional’s antecedent,
8 Our use of (35b) for deriving the last equivalence in (36) relies on an assumption (cf. (34)) thatm is outside
the region ⋃{LOC(x) ∶ x ∈ gs}. This assumption becomes linguistically more pregnant in our treatment of
DISTm↓ locatives, as discussed below.
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which indicates that this claim is a presupposition of the antecedent rather than part
of the assertion.
Getting back to sentences (37a–b), we have concluded that the two sentences are
not conversationally equivalent: sentence (37a) presupposes that Michael is outside
London whereas (37b) does not. (37b) only presupposes that Michael is outside some
or other part of London. Incidentally, this is true in all situations, even when Michael
is in London. The conclusion is that in situations where Michael is outside London,
both sentences in (37) can be safely asserted, since all their relevant presuppositions
are met. Furthermore, in such cases there is no truth-conditional difference between
the two sentences: if Michael is outside London then he is close to London if and only
if he is close to some part of the city. This illustrates what von Fintel (1999) calls
Strawson-entailments: cases where an entailment holds between sentences provided
that all their presuppositions are satisfied. Accordingly, we say that sentences (37a)
and (37b) are Strawson-equivalent.
Against this background, let us now consider the denotations of the locatives close
to and at most 20km from that are derived from definition (31) for the sets of distances
[0, r) and [0,20] respectively. For any region A and point x /∈ A, we have:
(39) CLOSE_TO(x, A) ⇔ DIST[0,r)(x, A) ⇔ d(x, A) < r
(40) AT_MOST_20KM_FROM(x, A) ⇔ DIST[0,20](x, A) ⇔ d(x, A) ≤ 20
In words: the relation CLOSE_TO holds between the region A and a point x outside A
if the distance between x and A is smaller than some specified ‘small’ distance r ;
AT_MOST_20KM_FROM holds if the distance between x and A is at most 20km. It should
be noted that the intervals [0, r) and [0,20] are both downward-monotone within the
set of non-negative reals. Further, we should note that since definitions (39) and (40)
are based on definition (31), they are only specified for cases in which the point x is
not in A, i.e. the outside presupposition of the corresponding sentence holds.
Now we observe, in contrast to (34), that for any set R of real numbers that is
downward-monotone as in (39) and (40), the following fact holds similar to fact (24b)
about INSIDE locatives.
(41) Let R be an downward-monotone set of distances. For any collection of regions
A and a point x /∈ ∪A, we have:
DISTR(x,∪A) ⇔ ∃A ∈ A.DISTR(x, A)
In words: when R is downward-monotone, the distance between the union of regions
inA and a point x outside this union is in R iff the distance between x and some region
A in A is in R (cf. (22a)). Specifically in our examples of DISTm↓ locatives, we get:
(42) a. CLOSE_TO(x,∪A) ⇔ ∃A ∈ A.CLOSE_TO(x, A)
b. AT_MOST_20KM_FROM(x,∪A) ⇔ ∃A ∈ A.AT_MOST_20KM_FROM(x, A)
These facts explain why sentences like (37a) and (37b) are judged to be equivalent
under the presupposition of (37a) that Michael is outside London.
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Moving back to indefinites, we see that given the PEH, facts (42a) and (42b) also
explain the pseudo-existential interpretation of locative indefinites with DISTm↓ loca-
tives. For instance, let us reconsider sentence (29b), restated in (43a) below, and its
pseudo-existential interpretation in (43b).
(43) a. Michael is at most 20km from a gas station.
b. Michael is at most 20km from SOME∃ gas station.
Our property-based treatment of sentence (43a) leads to the following analysis of this
sentence.
(44) Asserted: AT_MOST_20KM_FROM(m, LOC(GS))
Presupposed: OUTSIDE(m, LOC(GS))
Whenever the presupposition in (44) holds, the definition of OUTSIDE in (21) means
that the point m is not in the gas station eigenspace LOC(GS), or, in terms of the PEH:
(45) m /∈ ∪{LOC(x) ∶ x ∈ gs}
Accordingly, we get:
(46) AT_MOST_20KM_FROM(m, LOC(GS)) ▹ assertion-part of (43a)
⇔ AT_MOST_20KM_FROM(m,
⋃
{LOC(x) ∶ x ∈ gs}) ▹ by PEH
⇔∃x ∈ gs.AT_MOST_20KM_FROM(m, LOC(x)) ▹ by (42b)
The last equivalence follows from the general property (41) of DISTm↓ locatives, whose
condition x /∈ ∪A holds here thanks to the outside presupposition in (45).
So farwe have only consideredmonotone distal locatives and seen how they support
pseudo-existential and pseudo-universal interpretations. Let us now move on to cases
where the distance predicate within a distal locative is non-monotone. In such cases the
interpretations that emerge cannot simply be described as ‘existential’ or ‘universal’.
Sentence (47) below illustrates this point.
(47) Michael is (exactly) 20km from London.
The interpretation of (47) is non-existential because in a situation where some part of
London is 20km from Michael, the sentence may still be false if there is another part
of London at a shorter distance. The interpretation of (47) is also non-universal, since
the sentence may easily be true when many parts of London are at a distance of more
than 20km from Michael. The actual interpretation of sentence (47) is paraphrased
below.
(48) The part of London that is closest to Michael is 20km away from him.
On the background of the discussion above, this interpretation of (47) is hardly surpris-
ing.We associate the non-monotone distance predicate exactly 20kmwith the singleton
set {20}. The corresponding distal locative is accordingly defined below.
(49) 20KM_FROM(x, A) ⇔ DIST{20}(x, A) ⇔ d(x, A) = 20
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According to this analysis, sentence (47) makes the distal assertion d(m, L) = 20,
which requires that the closest point in L is 20km away fromm, as intuitively required.
This requirement is not simply existential: it is not satisfied if there are points in L
less than 20km from m. Nor is it universal: it may be satisfied when there are points
in L more than 20km from m.
A similar behavior is observedwith locative indefinites, as in the following sentence.
(50) Michael is (exactly) 20km from a gas station.
In our “desert context”, where the question under discussion is how likely it is that
Michael can continue the race, sentence (50) has an interpretation that is paraphrased
as follows.
(51) The gas station that is closest to Michael is 20km away from him.
With the considerations above, it is not surprising that this interpretation of sentence
(50) cannot be expressed as either existential or universal. To see that statement (51)
is not simple existential quantification over gas stations, suppose that one gas station
is exactly 20km from Michael, but there is also another gas station that is nearer to
Michael’s location, say at a distance of 10km. In the given context this situation makes
the prominent interpretationof sentence (50) false, although the existential requirement
(‘Michael is 20km from SOME∃ gas station’) is satisfied. Further, interpretation (51) is
not universal, since it allows many gas stations to be at larger distances than 20km.
We conclude that sentence (50) has a prominent non-existential interpretation,
which is furthermore non-universal. Our PEH-based analysis correctly derives this
interpretation, as formalized below.
(52) 20KM_FROM(m, LOC(GS))
By definition (49) of the distal relation 20KM_FROM, we get the following analysis.
(53) d(m, LOC(GS)) = 20
In words: the distance between Michael’s location and the location of the property GS
is exactly 20km. This means that the closest point in the region LOC(GS) is 20km from
the pointm. Thus, there must be some gas station 20km fromMichael, and every other
gas station is at a distance that is greater or equal to 20km. This is the interpretation
attested for sentence (50) in the given context.
We may, if we like, restate the same interpretation of sentence (50) in terms of
quantification over entities, as in the following sentence.
(54) Michael is at most 20km from SOME∃ gas station and at least 20km from EVERY∀
gas station.
The paraphrase (54) is equivalent to (51). However, this way of paraphrasing the
interpretation of sentence (50) may create the false impression that some or other
quantification over entities must always be part of the meaning of locative indefinites.
The paraphrase (54) relies on the possibility of presenting the non-monotone distal
predicate 20km as a boolean combination of the monotone distal predicates at least
20km and at most 20km. As in the domain of generalized quantifiers (Thijsse 1983),
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there are also non-monotone numeric predicates that cannot be expressed in this way.
One such example is the non-monotone distance predicate an even number of meters.
As Thijsse points out, such numeric expressions cannot be described as finite boolean
combinations of monotone expressions. Accordingly, we should not expect any finite
pseudo-quantificational paraphrase for sentences with DISTm¬ locatives like an even
number of meters from. Of course this is a rather artificial example, but it highlights
a general lesson: there is no guarantee that sentences with locative indefinites have
interpretations that can be paraphrased by using quantification over entities. In the
next section we see further evidence for this claim.
3.4 Projective locatives
Projective locatives describe positions relative to a specific direction from a landmark.
Some examples for this type of locatives are given below.
(55) Projective locatives: above, behind, north of, (to the) left of
Each of the projective locatives in (55) pertains to a different direction from the land-
mark. The determination of this direction in actual utterances is sensitive to various
contextual factors like gravitation or intrinsic properties of the landmark (Herskovits
1986). For instance, the prepositional phrase above John’s head describes locations
relative to an upward direction from John’s head.What is considered ‘upwards’may be
relative to the earth or to John’s posture. For instance, when John lies supine, the loca-
tive above John’s head may refer to two different directions. Contextual information
may prime any of these two directions.
The connection between projective locatives and the part–whole structure of land-
marks is often quite complex. This defines any attempt to describe their meanings by
using pseudo-quantificational paraphrases as we have so far done in our discussion
of topological and distal locatives. The following two sentences illustrate that in the
context of Fig. 1a.
(56) a. The dot is to the left of the line.
b. The dot is to the right of the line.
(a) (b)
Fig. 1 The dot is to the left of the line
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Sentence (56a) is intuitively true in Fig. 1a, whereas (56b) is false. Following Zwarts
and Winter (2000) (henceforth Z&W), we capture such effects by appealing to the
shortest vector from the landmark to the located object. In Fig. 1b this is the vector
v from the line to the dot. As illustrated, v has a non-zero ‘left of’ component cL(v).
By contrast, v has zero component in the ‘right of’ direction.9 Accordingly, we adopt
the following definition of the projective concept LEFT_OF.
(57) For any region A and point x /∈ A:
LEFT_OF(x, A) ⇔
the shortest vector from A to x has a non-zero ‘left of’ component
Definition (57), together with the analogous definition for the locative RIGHT_OF,
accounts for the contrast between sentences (56a) and (56b) in the context of
Fig. 1. It would be hard to describe such contrasts in terms of pseudo-quantification
over parts of the line. The reason is that in Fig. 1, the dot is to the left of some parts of
the line and to the right of other parts of it. Thus, existential quantification over parts
of the line would make (56b) incorrectly true, and universal quantification over parts
of the line would make (56a) incorrectly false. The interpretation of sentences like
(56a–b) inherently involves the shape of the objects and their spatial configuration.
In general it is hard, if not impossible, to describe meanings of locatives correctly
in terms of quantification over parts without taking into account the more ‘holistic’
aspects of spatial concepts. For this reason, the behavior of projective concepts as in
(56) and Fig. 1a is a good test for our analysis of indefinites.
Let us consider the locative indefinites in the following sentences, vis à vis the facts
described above.
(58) a. The dot is to the left of a circle.
b. The dot is to the right of a circle.
In the context of Fig. 2a, both (58a) and (58b) may be interpreted as true. This fact
is consistent with the existential interpretation of these sentences: in Fig. 2a the dot
is to the left of one circle and to the right of another circle. This is accounted for in
our proposal by the standard existential analysis, which is assumed as an option for
all occurrences of indefinites (Sect. 2). What is more surprising is that in the context
of Fig. 2a there is a clear contrast between the two sentences in (58). While sentence
(58a) is univocally true in Fig. 2a, sentence (58b) may easily be interpreted as false.
Grimm et al. (2014) report experimental results that consistently show this effect with
indefinites in projective locatives. In relation toDutch examples similar to (58), Grimm
et al. report that out of 21 Dutch speaking participants, 15 accepted a sentence similar
to (58a) as true in a situation like Fig. 2a. By contrast, only 5 of the 21 participants
accepted a sentence similar to (58b) as true in this situation. This indicates that in
9 For any non-zero vectors v and w in a vector space V , v’s component along w is the (provably unique)
vector cw(v) that satisfies v = cw(v) + u, where ‘+’ is vector addition and u is the (provably unique)
projection of the vector v on the set w of vectors orthogonal to w (see e.g. Lang 1977, p. 134). Interpreted
in these terms, Fig. 1b demonstrates that v has a non-zero component along any non-zero vector in the ‘left’
direction.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 2 The dot is to the left of a circle
the context of Fig. 2a, a non-existential strategy is more prominent in (58b) than the
existential strategy.
The PEH offers a direct explanation of this non-existential strategy. According to
the PEH-based analysis, sentence (58a) has a reading paraphrased as in (59a), whereas
(58b) has the reading in (59b).
(59) a. The dot is to the left of the area occupied by the circles.
b. The dot is to the right of the area occupied by the circles.
The PEH-based paraphrase (59a) of (58a) is true in Fig. 2a according to the same
principles that make sentence (56a) true in Fig. 1. Analogously, the PEH-based para-
phrase (59b) of (58b) is false in Fig. 2a similarly to (56b) in Fig. 1. More formally,
consider our PEH-based analysis of (58a) in (60) below. The notation CIRC and circ is
for the property denotation of the noun circle and for its set extension, respectively.
The notation d is for the eigenspace of the dot.
(60) LEFT_OF(d, LOC(CIRC)) ▹ property-based analysis of (58a)
⇔ the shortest vector from LOC(CIRC) to d has a non-zero ‘left of’
component
▹ by definition (57)
⇔ the shortest vector from ∪{LOC(x) ∶ x ∈ circ} to d has a non-zero
‘left of’ component
▹ by PEH
⇔ the shortest vector to d from the circle in circ that is closest to d has a
non-zero‘left of’ component
In Fig. 2a we have circ = {c1, c2}, and the closest circle to d is c1. Therefore, the
shortest vector from the eigenspace of the indefinite a circle to d is the vector v from
c1 to d. As illustrated in Fig. 2b, this vector has a non-zero left component cL(v).
Hence the PEH-based analysis of sentence (58a) is true in Fig. 2a. By contrast, the
PEH analyzes sentence (58b) as false, since v has a zero right component. According
to the assumed derivational ambiguity of indefinites, both sentences also have a true
reading in Fig. 2a. This explains why some speakers accept (58a) and reject (58b) in
Fig. 2a, while other speakers accept both sentences. For the first group of speakers, the
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PEH-based strategy is apparently more salient than the existential strategy, hence they
accept (58a) but reject (58b) with Fig. 2a. For the second group the existential strategy
is more salient, hence they accept both sentences with this figure. For the situation in
Fig. 2a, all speakers accepted sentence (58a) as true, as the PEH and the existential
strategy converge. We conclude that the PEH, combined with our assumption about
the derivational ambiguity of locative indefinites, correctly describes the contrast we
found between sentences (58a) and (58b) in the context of Fig. 2a.
3.5 Modified locatives
Locative prepositions may appear together with a preceding modificational element
within the PP. A modifier of a locative may be a distal predicate as in 10km outside
or an adverb as in diagonally above. We focus on three types of modified locatives,
exemplified in (61) below.
(61) Modified locatives
a. Topological locative, distal modifier:
far outside (of), deep inside (of), two miles within
b. Projective locative, adverbial modifier:
diagonally above, straight in front of, right beneath
c. Projective locative, distal modifier:
10km north of, deep under, high above, miles west of
Wewill show further support for the PEH generalization (16) by observing that modi-
fied PPs also show close parallelisms between the interpretation of locative indefinites
and the interpretation of locative referential NPs. We concentrate on three test cases of
PP modification, one for each of the three classes in (61). For each test case we show
a simple strategy for interpreting modified PPs with referential NPs. Then we show
that the same strategy accounts for non-existential effects with locative indefinites.
Test case 1: distal modification of topological “outside”
Let us consider the following example.
(62) The hotel is far outside the city center.
In (62) the preposition outside is used topologically, and the PP is modified by the
distal predicate far. We can restate such sentences using a conjunction of a topological
statement and a distal statement, as in the following paraphrase.10
10 This conjunctive strategy is not general, and is only made possible by the topological use of outside in
(62). However, there is also a projective use for outside: in the stall is diagonally outside the restaurant,
the entrance of the restaurant is seen as projecting a direction similar to in front of. As we see below, in
such cases PP modification cannot be treated by using conjunction. The conjunctive strategy also fails with
modification of topological INSIDE locatives, as in the station is located 50 miles within the park, which
means that the station is 50 miles from the border of the park, not from the park itself. For such cases, we
also need to use a more general strategy for modifying projective PPs, as discussed below.
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(63) The hotel is outside the city center and far from the city center.
Because of the equivalence between (62) and (63), the meaning of the modified PP can
be described by using a conjunction between the distal locative and the topological
locative. Formally, we define the modified locative concept FAR_OUTSIDE as follows.
(64) FAR_OUTSIDE(x, A) ⇔ FAR_FROM(x, A) ∧ OUTSIDE(x, A)
This simple analysis is satisfactory for sentence (62). In such cases the topological
concept OUTSIDE adds little semantic content to the purely distal statement the hotel is
far from the city center.11 Thus, the analysis in (64) together with our account of distal
and topological locatives explains why the interpretation of (62) is pseudo-universal,
as paraphrased below.
(65) The hotel is far outside EVERY∀ part of the city center.
Indefinites within modified OUTSIDE locatives may also give rise to pseudo-universal
effects. Let us consider the following examples from the internet.
(66) a. This scene shows Roamer ships encountering a huge, derelict alien city in
space, far outside of a star system.
b. The participants were primarily Caucasian and lived at least 25 miles out-
side of a town of 12,500 or more people.
Sentence (66a), with the upward-monotone distal modifier far, can be paraphrased by
“far outside every star system”. Similarly, the upward-monotone modifier at least 25
miles in (66b) also gives rise to a pseudo-universal effect: the participants are claimed
to live at a distance of at least 25 miles from every big town. The PEH correctly treats
such non-existential indefinites by using the conjunctive assumption in (64), and the
analysis of indefinites within topological and distal locatives in Sects. 3.2 and 3.3
above. In a similar way, the PEH augmented by the conjunctive analysis account of
PP modification analyzes non-existential effects with downward-monotone modifiers
and topological outside, as in the following example from the internet.
(67) There’s a large selection of campus universities—many built in the 1960s—
usually located a few miles outside of a town or city.
Sentence (68a) below simplifies (67), and can be paraphrased as in (68b).
(68) a. The campus is located a few miles outside of a city.
b. The campus is located outside of EVERY∀ city, and a few miles from SOME∃
city.
Thismixture of a pseudo-universal and a pseudo-existential effect is directly explained
by the PEH and the analysis of the modified PP as a conjunction of the OUTSIDE locative
and the DISTm↓ locative a few miles from. The OUTSIDE locative contributes the pseudo-
universal effect, whereas the DISTm↓ locative makes a pseudo-existential contribution.
11 This distal sentence entails that the hotel is outside the city center. Possibly, this entailment is only a
Strawson-entailment, based on an outside presupposition of far from. However, in (62) the assertion of an
outside statement is bound to cancel any possible outside presupposition.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 3 Diagonally above the house
Test case 2: adverbial modifiers with projective locatives
The conjunctive analysis is not a general solution to the problem of modified locatives.
Matters become more complex when the modified locative is projective. To see that,
let us consider sentences (69a–b) below, based on Z&W’s discussion of projective
locatives with adverbial modifiers.
(69) a. The dot is straight above the circle.
b. The dot is diagonally above the circle.
The locatives STRAIGHT_ABOVE and DIAGONALLY_ABOVE in (69) cannot simply be defined
based on intersection with the denotation of the modifiers straight and diagonally.
The reason is that it is hard to conceive of these two adverbials as binary relations
on locations. In (69) the modifiers do not simply describe ‘straight’ or ‘diagonal’
positions or directions from the circle. What counts as ‘straight’ or ‘diagonal’ can
only be determined relative to a given direction from the landmark. In (69) the relevant
direction (‘upward’) is determined by the preposition above. As Z&W note, this kind
of phenomenon poses a challenge for any straightforward intersective analysis of the
modification in (69). Z&W account for modified PPs as in (69) using their notion of
shortest vectors. As an example for this analysis, we consider the following sentence
in the situation of Fig. 3a.
(70) The bird is diagonally above the house.
Sentence (70) is true in Fig. 3a but false (or highly weird) in Fig. 3b. Z&W’s analysis
uses the shortest vector between the bird and the house to account for this contrast.
In Fig. 3a the shortest vector can truthfully be characterized as ‘diagonal with respect
to the above direction’. By contrast, in Fig. 3b the shortest vector from the house
to the bird is not diagonal but straight with respect to the above direction from the
house. Summarizing, and skipping some formal details, we restate Z&W’s account of
sentence (70) by specifying the locative DIAGONALLY_ABOVE as follows.
(71) DIAGONALLY_ABOVE(x, A)
⇔ the shortest vector from A to x is diagonal with respect to the
above direction
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(a) (b)
Fig. 4 Diagonally above a cloud
This analysis highlights the fact that the interpretation of sentence (70) cannot be
described as pseudo-existential. For the bird to be diagonally above the house, it is
not enough for it to be diagonally above some part of the house. If that were the case,
sentence (70) should have been equally acceptable in Fig. 3a and b. Rather, for the
bird to be diagonally above the house it has to be diagonally above the closest part of
the house, as required by Z&W’s account.
Let us now consider the following locative indefinite sentence in the context of
Fig. 4a.
(72) The bird is diagonally above a cloud.
In Fig. 4a, sentence (72) is intuitively true. By contrast, in Fig. 4b, the sentence is
true under its existential interpretation, but intuitively it also has a non-existential
interpretation, under which it is false. To see this in a more natural context, consider
the following example, which describes two cases of aerial inflammations.12
(73) The first case arises when the inflammation is straight above a thick cloud, the
second when it is obliquely above a thick cloud.
Sentence (73) refers to two distinct cases of inflammation. Thus, in the second case,
where the inflammation is obliquely above some thick cloud, we expect the first case
not to hold, i.e. we expect the inflammation not to be located straight above any other
thick cloud. This shows a non-existential effect in the interpretation of the italicized
PP in (73): the locative indefinite refers to the position of the inflammation relative to
the closest cloud below it. This is the same ‘non-existential’ behavior we observed in
sentence (70), where the part of the house that is relevant for (70)’s truth in Fig. 3a is
the part that is closest to the bird.
When we adopt Z&W’s shortest vector account we can readily use the PEH to
account for non-existential effects with indefinites as in (72) and (73). Specifically,
for (72) we get the following analysis.
12 This example simplifies a more complex description from the book Aristotle’s Meteorology and Its
Reception in the Arab World (P. Lettinck, Brill, 1999, p. 72): “The colours in the sky arise because light
from the inflamed ‘fire’ is seen either refracted or reflected against the thicker air. The first case arises when
the inflammation is above a cloud that is not too thick, the second when it is obliquely above a thick cloud”.
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(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 5 Modified locatives with a referential NP and with an indefinite
(74) DIAGONALLY_ABOVE(b, LOC(CLOUD)) ▹ property-based analysis of (72)
⇔ shortest vector from LOC(CLOUD) to b is diagonal w.r.t. ‘above’ direction
▹ by Z&W’s analysis (71)
⇔ shortest vector from ∪{LOC(x) ∶ x ∈ cloud} to b is diagonal w.r.t.
‘above’ direction
▹ by PEH
⇔ the shortest vector to b from the cloud in cloud that is closest to b is
diagonal w.r.t. the ‘above’ direction
This analysis of sentence (72) is true in Fig. 4a but false in Fig. 4b. Accordingly, it is
useful for describing the behavior of such sentences in contexts like (73).
Test case 3: distal modifiers with projective locatives
As illustrated in (61c) above, projective locatives are often modified by distal predi-
cates. Let us now consider the following sentence, with a locative referential NP, in
the situation of Fig. 5a.
(75) The dot is 10cm below the line.
Sentence (75) is intuitively judged as true in Fig. 5a. As noted in Sect. 3.4, similar
situations support ‘non-existential’ interpretations of such sentences with projective
locatives. Also sentence (75) cannot be paraphrased by stating that the dot is 10cm
below some part of the line. In Sect. 3.4 we saw how the PEH makes a connec-
tion between this fact and non-existential effects with indefinites in simple projective
locatives. Now let us observe a similar point with respect to indefinites in modified
projective locatives. This is illustrated by the following sentence.
(76) The dot is 10cm below a circle.
In Fig. 5b, sentence (76) is intuitively true. This is not simply an existential effect: sen-
tence (76) is much less felicitous as describing Fig. 5c, where another circle intervenes
between the dot and the circle that is 10cm above it. Thus, this is another illustration
for the non-existential interpretation of indefinites within projective PPs, discussed in
Sect. 3.4.
However, unlike the projective constructions treated in Sect. 3.4, we cannot use
Z&W’s shortest vector analysis for either sentence (76) or (75). Reconsider sentence
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(75).While this sentence is judged as true in Fig. 5a, Z&W’s analysis incorrectly treats
it as false. This is because the shortest vector from the line to the dot in Fig. 5a does not
point downwards, and it is shorter than 10cm. We can solve this problem for Z&W’s
account by using the following analysis of sentence (75).
(77) The shortest vector to the dot that points downward from the line is 10cm long.
This statement is true in Fig. 5a, as intuitively required for sentence (75). When
analyzing sentence (76) we use the same method, now employing the PEH analysis
of the indefinite. We get the following analysis.
(78) The shortest vector to the dot that points downward from eigenspace of the
circles is 10cm long.
This statement is true in Fig. 5b but false in Fig. 5c, as intuitively required for sentence
(76).
Other cases of projective PPs modified by distal predicates show non-existential
effects similar to sentence (76). The following examples from the internet illustrate
that.
(79) a. The VFR rules say that you must stay at least 500 feet below a cloud, more
than 1000 feet above a cloud, and more than 2000 feet to the side of a
cloud. (online network simulating real world flying and air traffic control)
b. The pilot reported that he had been flying approximately 500 to 800 feet
below a cloud layer that he estimated to be broken at 4,000 agl. (website
on aviation accidents, agl=above ground level)
Similarly to sentence (76), also the sentences in (79a–b) haveprominent non-existential
interpretations: the indefinites do not refer to distances to an arbitrary cloud, but to
distances to a cloud (or a cloud layer) that is closest to the located object. Therefore,
(79a–b) are not accounted for by a simple existential analysis. Rather, they are treated
by the same revision of Z&W’s analysis that we used for sentence (76). More details
on this necessary revision are deferred to future work.
3.6 Summary: the PEH and locative indefinites
In this section we have seen various non-existential effects with locative indefinites.
Some of these effects are pseudo-universal, with the topological locative OUTSIDE and
upward-monotone distal locatives like FAR_FROM. However, in many other cases the
non-existential effects with locative indefinites are more complex. This is especially
the case with non-monotone distal locatives, projective locatives and modified loca-
tives. As we have seen, whenever locative indefinites exhibit non-existential effects
we find locative sentences with referential NPs that show similar effects with respect
to the part–whole structure of entities. These correlations are expected by the PEH
generalization in (16). They help us to explain away the apparently recalcitrant behav-
ior of locative indefinites as a pseudo-quantificational effect, which follows directly
from standard geometrical assumptions about locatives and the treatment of indefi-
nites as denoting properties under the Property-Eigenspace Hypothesis. The PEH does
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not stand in opposition to the traditional existential/specific account, which we still
assume as one of the possible derivations with property-denoting indefinites. The PEH
does stand in opposition to any approach that strives to account for all interpretations
of locative indefinites as following from existential quantification over entities. In the
next section we discuss one possible attempt to follow such a line, and show reasons
to reject it.
4 What makes pure existential accounts undesirable?
An alternative to our property-based approach might be to assume that locative
indefinites only denote existential quantifiers, but lead, by some means or other, to
non-existential effects at the sentence level. In this section we briefly consider a possi-
ble version of this idea, suggested to us by an anonymous L&P reviewer. The reviewer
proposes to analyze certain locatives as containing a covert negation operator that
takes scope over an existential quantifier. After elaborating on this idea, we argue that
it is conceptually inelegant and show that it is insufficient as a general theory of the
phenomena described in Sect. 3.
4.1 Introducing covert negation in locatives
The idea to add covert negation to the analysis of locatives is inspired by classic logical
equivalences as in (80) below, where a negated existential behaves like a universal
quantifier over a negated proposition.
(80) ¬∃x .P(x) ⇔ ∀x .¬P(x)
The equivalence in (80) is standardly used for explaining scopal interactions of indef-
inites with negation, as in sentence (81) below.
(81) John did not see a lion.
Sentence (81) has an existential/specific interpretation (‘there’s a lion that John didn’t
see’) and a universal interpretation (‘for each lion x , John didn’t see x’). These two
interpretations are traditionally analyzed as two different readings of sentence (81)
under structural ambiguity. This is illustrated by the following simplified syntactic-
semantic analysis of the ambiguity.
(82) a. John [[did not see] SOME∃ lion] ∃x ∈ lion.¬see(j, x)
b. John [did not [see SOME∃ lion]] ¬∃x ∈ lion.see(j, x)
⇔ ∀x ∈ lion.¬see(j, x)
In analysis (82a) the existential quantifier takes scope over the negated verb. By con-
trast, in (82b), the existential quantifier takes scope below negation, which leads to a
universal effect at the sentential level, as intuitively required.
An anonymous L&P reviewer suggests to use a similar line for treating locative
indefinites as in our initial example (1a), which is reproduced below.
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(83) Michael is far from a gas station.
Sentence (83) does not contain overt negation. However, suppose that the locative far
from in (83) is considered synonymous with the expression not close to, and is decom-
posed at some level of the syntactic-semantic analysis into this negated form.With the
necessary lexical and syntactic assumptions, sentence (83) might then be treated as
scopally ambiguous similar to sentence (81). More concretely, using decomposition
we may treat sentence (83) as having the following two analyses.
(84) a. Michael is [[not close to] SOME∃ gas station] ∃x ∈ gs.¬close_to(m, x)
b. Michael is [not [close to SOME∃ gas station]] ¬∃x ∈ gs.close_to(m, x)
⇔ ∀x ∈gs.¬close_to(m, x)
In this analysis, the indefinite a gas station is treated as existential under both readings
of the sentence, but one of the readings is universal due to the scope of the covert
negation operator over the existential quantifier.
4.2 Arguments against the covert negation analysis of locatives
There are various reasons for rejecting the covert negation idea as a general
account of locative indefinites. These reasons concern problems with non-universal
interpretations, the massive decomposition required, unclear relations with other
decompositional approaches, and the distribution of a/some contrasts.
Non-universal locative indefinites. Negating an existential quantifier results in uni-
versal quantification. However, some of the effects reviewed in Sect. 3 are neither
existential nor universal. Covert negation would not help in treating these examples.13
Thus, a proponent of the idea that indefinites unambiguously denote existential quan-
tifiers might try to capture contrasts as in (58a–b) by augmenting the system with
some additional principles, e.g. a proximity principle that would give primacy to the
circle in Fig. 2 that is closer to the dot. Such a principle would stipulate one prediction
of the PEH-based analysis and incorporate it into the semantic analysis of existential
indefinites, without giving any support to the decompositional approach itself. Sim-
ilar remarks hold with respect to the non-universal interpretations of non-monotone
modified locatives presented in Sect. 3.5.
The contrast between ‘a’ and ‘some’. As we saw, some indefinites in PPs like far from
some gas station only show existential/specific interpretations. The decompositional
approach may block the universal analysis by using the common assumption that
some is a positive-polarity item, i.e. an expression that cannot appear in the scope of
negation (Szabolcsi 2004; Giannakidou 2011). This standard assumption would not
help to analyze some indefinites in constructions like the dot is to the left of/10cmbelow
13 For the contrast (58a–b) in the context of Fig. 2, let us suppose that we tried to analyze to the left of a
circle as not to the right of SOME∃ circle. This would only derive an incorrect universal analysis for (58a).
Furthermore, such an analysis would not account for the same contrast in the symmetric situations with
right of.
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some circle, where again, only the existential interpretation is available. Since such
cases cannot be analyzed by covert negation, the decompositional approach would
need a separate principle for explaining the difference between some and a when
appearing with projective locatives like left of and right of.
Decomposition beyond ‘far from’. As we saw in Sect. 3.3, upward-monotone distal
locatives like at least 20km from show the same (pseudo-)universal interpretations as
far from. In the decompositional approach, this would mean that also these locatives
should be analyzed as containing covert negation. For instance, the locative at least
20km from a church would have to be decomposed into not less than 20km from a
church. Further, to capture the mixed existential/universal effects we saw with non-
monotone distal locatives, wewould need to decompose the locative exactly 20km from
a church into at most 20km from a church and not less than 20km from a church. A
theory thatwould try to adopt such decompositional stipulations formodified numerals
would be unnecessarily complicated and inelegant.
Modification of decomposed locatives. Yet another complication for the decompo-
sitional approach is the treatment of modified locatives like 3m outside. To capture
the pseudo-universal behavior of outside, as described in Sect. 3.2, the decomposi-
tional approach would have to decompose it into not inside. However, the form 3m not
inside is ungrammatical. To analyze such strings, the decompositional analysis would
have to stipulate ad hoc semantic mechanisms only in order to analyze decomposed
representations that the theory generates.
Selecting the decomposed item in antonymous pairs. Even in relation to the apparently
successful decomposition of sentence (83) above there are some unresolved theoretical
questions. While some works have assumed decomposition of adjectives, we are not
aware of any independent motivation for the particular decomposition that the anony-
mous reviewer suggests for sentence (83). For instance, Büring (2007) proposes to
decompose negative adjectives like short into little long. Heim (2008) argues against
this proposal. However, even ignoring Heim’s critique, we do not see how to reconcile
the reviewer’s suggestion with Büring’s proposal. In the decompositional treatment
that was suggested to us, the locative containing the positive adjective far is decom-
posed by using the adjective close. By contrast, in Büring’s analysis the adjective close
would be decomposed as little far, whereas the morpheme far would be left intact.
Thus, as far as we can see, the decompositional analysis that the reviewer suggested
for sentence (83) is inconsistent with Büring’s proposal.
Summary.We have seen that the decompositional approach to locative indefinitesmust
be limited to those cases that are interpreted universally. These are only a small subset
of the non-existential effects that we have studied with locative indefinites. More com-
plicated assumptions must be introduced to account for other non-existential effects.
Furthermore, even with the upward-monotone distal locatives, which are interpreted
universally, the decompositional approach would have to be quite cumbersome, and
in conflict with other decompositional approaches to adjectives.
A note on NPIs. A conceivable argument in favor of the covert-negation approach
is the distribution of negative polarity items, as illustrated by contrasts like far from
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(#close to) any car (Iatridou 2003, 2007). Such contrastsmight be accounted for by the
reviewer’s proposal that far from, but not close to, involves a covert negative element.
However, this would not constitute an advantage over the PEH. As we show in Sect.
5, our proposal directly accounts for such contrasts with NPIs by relying on the same
locative denotations we used above for far from and close to, which are distinguished
in terms of their monotonicity properties. These properties are standardly used for
explaining the distribution of NPIs without any postulation of covert negation.
5 Further issues
In this section we briefly remark on some broader implications of the semantics we
have proposed for locative indefinites. We start out with two possible extensions of the
framework for treating related problems with collective plural descriptions and with
negative polarity items. Then we briefly remark on some open problems regarding
property indefinites and part–whole structures, which are also of much relevance to
the analysis of locative indefinites.
5.1 Treating locative plurals and locative NPIs
5.1.1 Locative collections and eigenspace convexity
Our treatment of pseudo-quantificational effects with locative indefinites has gained
support from the similar behavior of entity-referring NPs. Our initial examples were
the equivalences between far from London and ‘far from every part of London’, and
between close to London and ‘close to some part of London’. Part–whole structure is
also manifested in the compositional semantics of NPs involving collective reference.
Let us consider for instance the noun phrases the mountains and the mountain range
in the following examples.
(85) a. The house is far from the
mountains.
b. The house is far from the
mountain range.
(86) a. The house is close to the
mountains.
b. The house is close to the
mountain range.
The sentences in (85) mean that the house is far from every mountain (in the mountain
range). By contrast, in (86a–b), only one of the mountains has to be close to the house.
Thus, like singular indefinites, also referential plurals (the mountains) and referential
group terms (themountain range) show the existential/universal variability we observe
with ‘simple’ singular NPs like London, the city or Sierra Nevada. In all these cases,
geometric features of the locative uniformly determine the pseudo-quantificational
interpretation.We conclude that referential NPs, both singular and plural, are assigned
eigenspaces that partake in a uniform way in the spatial interpretation of locative
sentences. From the point of view of theories of plurality this uniformity is hardly
surprising: both referential plurals and singular group terms are often treated as entity-
denoting, similar to referential singular NPs (Winter and Scha 2015).
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Fig. 6 The house is 10m from the (row of) utility poles/#10m from a utility pole
We might assume that the assignment of eigenspaces to singular and plural entity-
denoting NPs is identical to how eigenspaces are assigned to property-denoting
indefinites. However, in one respect locative indefinites are different from locative
referential NPs. According to the PEH, when a property P is assigned an eigenspace,
this has to be the union of the eigenspaces of entities in P’s extension. However, using
a completely analogous analysis for locative referential NPs would not be fully accu-
rate. Locative referential NPs have a tendency to show an ‘atomic’ behavior, which
sets them apart from property-denoting indefinites. To see what we mean by that, let
us consider the following examples in the context of Fig. 6.
(87) a. The house is (exactly) 10m away from the (row of) utility poles.
b. The house is (exactly) 10m away from a utility pole.
In Fig. 6, the pole that is closest to the house is more than 10m away from it. Despite
this fact, the sentences in (87a) may be interpreted as true: we may think of the
eigenspace of the description the (row of) utility poles as including the electric cable
that the poles support, or even just an imaginary line between them. This geometric
‘extension’ procedure is not at work in sentence (87b), which must be interpreted as
false in Fig. 6. Like Zwarts and Winter (2000), we propose that in sentence (87a), the
eigenspace of the landmark is the convex hull of the poles’ locations, here the line
segment between them.14 This means that the eigenspace of the plural or group term
is a proper superset of the union of eigenspaces for the single poles. This ‘geometric
extension’ is a well-known effect with spatial expressions: in a similar way, sentences
like the dot is inside the ring may be interpreted as true when the actual material of
the ring does not contain the dot, but the dot is surrounded by the ring.15 As we saw, a
parallel ‘geometric extension’ procedure is not licensed with locative indefinites as in
(87b). This contrast shows a clear difference between how eigenspaces are assigned to
entities and to properties. We cannot further study this difference here, but we believe
14 The convex hull of a region A (in a Euclidian space) is the smallest region B containing A, such that for
every two points x, y ∈ B, the line segment between x and y is contained in B. In the example above, the
convex hull of the finite set of poles on a line is the line segment connecting them. In the example the dot is
inside the ring below, the convex hull of an annular geometric shape is the outermost circle in that annulus.
15 In ‘the fox is inside the ring of hounds’, the fox is surrounded by the hounds. By contrast in ‘the bug is
inside the bagel’, the bug ismost likely to bewithin the bagel’s eigenspace.What is considered inside/outside
non-convex shapes like rings is partly decided by contextual factors. For further examples see Herskovits
(1986).
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that finding more contrasts of this sort would help to understand better the use of
eigenspaces in spatial semantics.16
5.1.2 Anti-additivity and negative polarity items
We have seen two classes of locatives that give rise to pseudo-universal interpreta-
tions: upward-monotone distal locatives like far from and more than 10km from, and
topological locatives like outside (of). These two classes of locatives show clear con-
trasts with downward-monotone distal locatives (close to, less than 10km from) and
the topological locative inside, which give rise to pseudo-existential interpretations.
The following equivalences reiterate these contrasts.
(88) a. Michael is far from London ⇔ Michael is far from every part of London.
b. Michael is close to London ⇔ Michael is close to some part of London.
(89) a. Michael is outside London ⇔ Michael is outside every part of London.
b. Michael is inside London ⇔ Michael is inside some part of London.
In formal terms, we have accounted for such contrasts using the following equiva-
lences, where x is a point, A is a region, and A is a set of regions (cf. (24), (35a),
(42a)).
(90) a. FAR_FROM(x,∪A) ⇔ ∀A ∈ A.FAR_FROM(x, A)
b. CLOSE_TO(x,∪A) ⇔ ∃A ∈ A.CLOSE_TO(x, A)
(91) a. OUTSIDE(x,∪A) ⇔ ∀A ∈ A.OUTSIDE(x, A)
b. INSIDE(x,∪A) ⇔ ∃A ∈ A.INSIDE(x, A)
In the linguistic literature, functions that support equivalences with universal state-
ments as in (90a) and (91a) are knownasanti-additive functions. Functions that support
equivalences with existential statements like (90b) and (91b) are often called additive.
Inmore precise terms, the equivalences in (90a)–(91b) illustrate (anti-)additivity on the
second argument of the locative relation. A simple fact is that anti-additive functions
are downward monotone, whereas additive functions are upward monotone.17
Anti-additivity, and more generally downward-monotonicity, are often used when
accounting for the distribution of negative polarity items (NPIs, see Fauconnier 1975;
16 For another relevant contrast between the two uses of eigenspaces, consider the sentence the circle is
inside the rectangles, which can be true when the circle is contained in the union of the rectangles, but not
in any single rectangle. By contrast, the circle is inside a rectangle is purely existential and cannot be true
in such a situation. Our proposal here does not account for such contrasts, since the located object the circle
is treated as a point, which cannot be contained in a finite union of rectangles unless it is contained in one
of them.
17 Standardly, we say that a function f ∶ ℘(E) → {0, 1} is downward monotone if for all A, B ⊆ E :
A ⊆ B ⇒ f (B) ≤ f (A), and upward monotone if for all A, B ⊆ E : A ⊆ B ⇒ f (A) ≤ f (B). The
‘⇒’ direction in (90a) and (91a) shows that FAR_FROM and OUTSIDE are downward monotone on their second
argument; the ‘⇐’ direction in (90b) (a Strawson-entailment) and (91b) shows that CLOSE_TO and INSIDE
are upward monotone on their second argument. Since distal locatives like less than 5km from are additive
on their second argument, they are upward monotone. However, the distal predicate within the locative,
i.e. less than 5km, is downward monotone. Therefore, somewhat counter-intuitively, we called such distal
locatives ‘DISTm↓’ despite their upward-monotonicity.
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Ladusaw 1979; Nam 1994; Zwarts 1998; Giannakidou 2011). For NPIs like any and
ever, a commonly proposed grammaticality filter is that they should appear in the
scope of an anti-additive function, or at least a downward-monotone function. With
respect to distal locatives like far from and close to, Iatridou (2003, 2007) discusses
contrasts like the following.
(92) Michael is far from (#close to) any gas station.
With outside and any, many examples like the following are easily found on the web.18
(93) Bobby Finger is outside any political niche or anything anyone could call a
mainstream media presence.
The site is outside any identified good risk area on the Environment.
I planted a 15 × 11 area to use as an orchard, it is outside of any forestry area.
Svalbard is outside of any social security exchange contract.
By contrast, when searching strings like inside any, we most frequently found NPIs
licensed by a non-locative downward-monotone function. For instance, in the clause
if the test point is inside any of the hole boundaries, the NPI licenser is most likely
the conditional. In many other cases of inside any, the item any is used as a free-
choice item rather than an NPI, e.g. Melophobia is inside any Humbug pilgrim (for
the NPI/FC distinction, see Giannakidou 2001).
Based on our treatment of locative indefinites, anti-additivity/downward-monotoni-
city of locatives accounts for the pattern observed with NPI licensing: far from/outside
(of) anynpi vs. #close to/inside anynpi. More evidence for this treatment, here again with
indefinites in the scope of the locative, come from the following entailments.
(94) a. Michael is far from a gas station ⇒ Michael is far from a big gas station.
b. Michael is close to a gas station /⇒ Michael is close to a big gas station.
(95) a. The school is outside of a metropolitan county
⇒ The school is outside of a big metropolitan county. (cf. (20c))
b. The school is within a metropolitan county
/⇒ The school is within a big metropolitan county.
We analyze the entailments of (94a) and (95a) as involving containment between
the extensions of the properties big gas station/gas station and big metropolitan
county/metropolitan county, hence also between their respective eigenspaces. With
these containment relations, the entailments in (94a) and (95a) are expected because
of the downward-monotonicity of far from and outside. By contrast, (94b) and (95b)
18 Lisa Matthewson suggests that in some cases there is a difference between outside any sentences like
the dog is outside any doghouse and the dog is outside (of) a doghouse, where the latter involves a stronger
domain restriction (e.g. the former is more easily acceptable in a context where there are no doghouses
around). We believe that this question can only be treated within a theory of NPIs, where domain widen-
ing/restriction effects are taken into account. This goes beyond the scope of this paper. Another empirical
question that Matthewson raises is whether there is a difference between outside (of) a and far from a in
terms of their domain restrictions. We, like Matthewson, believe that the former are more restrictive, but
we were not able to come up with decisive tests that would allow us to account for it.
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involve upward-monotone locatives, and the entailments are properly blocked by our
account. We note that a traditional, wide-scope existential analysis of the indefinites
in (94)–(95) would not account for these entailment patterns. For instance, in (94), if
there is a gas station x s.t. Michael is far from x , it does not follow that there is such
a big gas station.
We conclude that both the distribution of NPIs and the entailment patterns with
a indefinites support our characterization of anti-additivity with locatives, and more
importantly for the purposes of this paper, the analysis of a indefinites as having narrow
scope with respect to the locative expression.
5.2 Loose ends
5.2.1 Property-denoting indefinites, the a/some distinction, and indefinite subjects
As we have seen, locative indefinites with the article a get non-existential interpre-
tations, which the PEH analyzes by using their property denotation. Property-based
accounts have also proven useful for analyzing other phenomena with indefinites.
These phenomena include generic interpretations, predication constructions, there
sentences, intensional transitive verbs, and incorporation phenomena.19 Ideally, we
should like to know if the current property-based semantics can be part of a uni-
fied theory in this large linguistic domain. While this general question goes beyond
the scope of this paper, we would like to point out one of its important aspects: the
distinction between a indefinites and some indefinites. As we illustrated, some indef-
inites only show existential/specific interpretations in the locative constructions we
studied. In this respect locative indefinites are similar to singular generic indefinites
and predicative indefinites. This can be illustrated by the following pairs of sentences.
(96) A/some madrigal is polyphonic. (Lawler 1973)
(97) a. John is a/some man (I know).
b. I consider John a man/#some man.
(98) Mary is looking for a/some maid.
(99) There is a/some dog in the kitchen.
In (96) the generic interpretation obtains with the a indefinite but not with the some
indefinite. In (97) the a indefinite licenses the predication, whereas the some indefinite
is ruled out or only licensed under a wide-scope/specific existential interpretation
(Doron 1983; Winter 2001). In (98), the a indefinite can be interpreted as either de
dicto or de re, whereas the some prefers, or even requires, the de re interpretation.
By contrast, in (99), both the a and the some indefinites are licensed and lead to
a similar interpretation. This means that the line suggested here is consistent with
19 For analyses of these phenomena see: Cohen (2001), Greenberg (2007) on generic interpretations of
singular a indefinites; Partee (1987), Winter (2001), Landman (2014) on predicative a/some indefinites;
McNally (1998, 2011) on there sentences; Zimmermann (1993), Van Geenhoven and McNally (2005) on
intensional transitive verbs; Van Geenhoven (1998), Chung and Ladusaw (2003), Farkas and de Swart
(2003) on incorporation.
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theories of the phenomena in (96)–(98), which let a indefinites denote properties, but
avoid this denotation for some indefinites. However, theories like McNally’s (1998),
which rely on property denotations of indefinites to also account for their behavior in
there sentences, need to have a special account for the lack of the a/some contrast in
cases like (99), vis à vis the contrasts in (96)–(98).
A related issue concerns property interpretations of locative indefinites in subject
position. To see it, let us consider the contrast between sentences (100) and (101)
below in the given contexts.20
(100) Context: Michael is driving in the Mojave Desert, moving away from the Las
Vegas metropolitan area.
(However,) a gas station where Michael could rest and fuel up is still nearby.
(101) Context: Michael is driving in the Mojave Desert, moving towards the Las
Vegas metropolitan area.
(However,) a gas station where Michael could rest and fuel up is still faraway.
In the given contexts there is a clear contrast between (100) and (101). Sentence
(100) only has an existential/specific interpretation: one gas station near Michael is
enough to make it true. By contrast, sentence (101) requires Michael to be far from
all relevant gas stations. Thus, sentences (100) and (101), with a locative a indefinite
in the subject position, show the same pseudo-quantificational contrast that we have
observed all along in sentences where the locative indefinite is inside the PP. We note
that there is no a priori reason to think that it is the context in (100) and (101) that
favors the pseudo-existential or pseudo-universal interpretation. As far as the contexts
go, the situationmight have been the other way around. The fact that the interpretations
are as they are in (100) and (101) is further evidence for the PEH.
Notably, PEH-like effects with indefinite subjects as in (100)–(101) were consid-
erably harder to find than the other pseudo-quantificational effects we studied using
indefinites within locative PPs. For simple examples with indefinite subjects, e.g. a
gas station is nearby/faraway, speaker judgements are less secure and it is harder to
observe contrasts similar to the one between (100) and (101). The modal (‘could’)
and the temporal adverb (‘still’) make the judgements clearer in (100)–(101). This is
unlike the situation with indefinite PPs, e.g. close to/far from a gas station, where no
priming coming from modal or temporal expressions was required. We have no pre-
cise semantic proposal that would predict this difference between locative indefinites
in subject position and locative indefinites within PPs. Hopefully, on-going work on
asymmetries between indefinite subjects and indefinite objects may help to shed more
light on this problem (de Hoop and Kramer 2006; Bianchi and Belletti 2014).
5.2.2 Subpart monotonicity and part–whole structure
Part–whole relations and spatial relations have attracted much attention in the philo-
sophical literature and in semantic theory (Cruse 1979; Herskovits 1986; Winston
et al. 1987; Iris et al. 1988; Moltmann 1997; Casati and Varzi 1999; Johansson 2004).
20 We thank Heidi Klockmann and Yael Seggev for their help with these examples.
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Without getting into many of the relevant philosophical problems, this paper has con-
centrated on some linguistic puzzles about locatives and part–whole relations that seem
to us of importance for semantic theories of indefinites and plurals.We started our study
with subpart relations between descriptions of geographical units. As we saw, being in
a locative relation to a complex entity like London has clear implications for locative
relations to its subparts. For instance, being far from London entails being far from
Islington, by virtue of the subpart relation between these two geographical entities.
Further, we have also touched upon subpart relations between entities and collections.
One example for this kind of subpart relations is the one between the entity for Mt.
Whitney and the collection of entities denoted by descriptions like the mountains, the
mountain range or Sierra Nevada. This kind of subpart relations also affects pseudo-
quantificational interpretationswith locatives.We proposed—and this is the essence of
the PEH—that locative relations work similarly with indefinites like a city, which are
treated as denoting a property that has its own eigenspace. In this treatment, the entity
for a specific city like London stands in a part-of relation to the denotation of the indef-
inite a city, in much the same way as Islington stands in a part-of relation to London.
These different types of sub-part relations support spatial entailments like the following
(Iris et al. 1988, p. 435).
(102) Our friend is in Islington⇒ Our friend is in London.
(103) The camp is on Mt. Whitney⇒ The camp is in Sierra Nevada.
The camp is on Mt. Whitney ⇒ The camp is in the mountains (of Sierra
Nevada).
The camp is on Mt. Whitney⇒ The camp is in the mountain range (of Sierra
Nevada).
(104) Max is in London⇒Max is in a city.
The classification of the relation between London and a city as a ‘subpart’ relation
is the most debatable. This is because entailments as in (104) are also expected by
the traditional existential analysis of indefinites. However, while accepting the stan-
dard existential analysis as a viable option, we have seen that treating indefinites as
property-denoting has linguistic advantages over their unitary treatment as quanti-
fiers. This means that our PEH-based analysis of sentences like Max is in a city in
(104) is on a par with more classical accounts of sub-part entailments as in (102)
and (103).
Considering all the relations mentioned above as instances of one general subpart
relation, our accounts of all of these relations have consistently adopted the following
assumption, which Casati and Varzi (1999, p. 15) dub “obvious”.
(105) If y is subpart of x , then LOC(y) ⊆ LOC(x).
In words: when y is a subpart of x , x’s location must contain y. In our terms, this
assumption reflects a monotonicity of the eigenspace function LOC with respect to the
subpart order on objects (cf. Casati and Varzi 1999, p. 54). From this assumption we
conclude:
123
Far from obvious: the semantics of locative indefinites 473




In our analysis of indefinites, we strengthened this subset relation into an equality
whenever x is a property and Y is its extension. Thus, in the PEHwe proposed that the
location of a property equals the union of its extension’s member locations. We leave
it for further research to examine if a similar strengthening is also useful for subpart
relations that do not involve property-denoting indefinites.
6 Conclusion
We have seen ample motivation for analyzing a indefinites as systematically ambigu-
ous between properties and existential quantifiers. In locative PPs, this ambiguity
allows us to capture the parallelism between the pseudo-quantificational behavior of a
indefinites and the similar behavior of referential NPs with a part–whole structure. We
saw advantages to the property-based approach over a possible attempt to decompose
the meaning of locatives by using negation. Further, we saw support for our approach
coming from the behavior of NPIs and collective descriptions within locative PPs.
This gives substantial support for the property analysis of indefinites within a new
empirical domain: the spatial semantics of prepositional phrases.
The results reported in this paper also have some more general implications. The
proposal that speakers can express pseudo-quantificational statements by virtue of the
meaning of locative relations is only one instance of a recurrent theme in semantic the-
ory: the idea that lexical meanings of predicates may lead to pseudo-quantificational
effects. This idea goes back to Milsark and Carlson’s treatments of indefinites in the
1970s. Similar views were expressed in Kroch (1974) and Scha (1981) in relation
to the semantics of plurals and distributivity. The link between pseudo-quantification
and lexical knowledge is central for semantic theory, an area that is caught between
questions about syntactic structure and problems of mental concept modeling. Further,
existential quantifiers in our account are not lexical denotations of certain indefinite
articles. Rather, we view existential quantification as part of a derivational process
in natural languages, possibly in all of them. When an indefinite denotes a property,
existential mechanisms may or may not be at work, depending on the syntactic envi-
ronment. This idea too goes back at least to Milsark and Carlson’s works, but it is
also prominent in theories based on Partee’s flexibility thesis, as well as in treatments
of event variables, unselective binding of pronouns, choice functions, and other influ-
ential works in formal semantics over the last 40 years. We believe that the present
study may help to further extend this line of work into a comprehensive theory of
indefiniteness, spatial expressions and part–whole structure.
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